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ABSTRACT 
In the 1970s, while a leftist military dictatorship ruled Peru, more than 22 million acres of 
cultivated or grazing farmland – one-third of Peru’s total agricultural acreage, or seven-and-a-half 
times the land area of Connecticut – were expropriated from thousands of large owners as part of a 
property reform intended to benefit up to 400,000 landless peasant families. The compensation 
provided to landowners was miserly, however:  on average, it was less than one-tenth the then-
prevailing market price of water-accessible, cultivated land. Moreover, about 85 percent of total 
recognized land values were settled not in cash but with long-term Agrarian Debt Bonds, which 
committed future governments to honor fixed coupons on obligations maturing in 20 to 30 years. 
These bonds became worthless during the 1980s, however, because hyperinflation raged and 
the Peruvian currency lost most of its value. In the wake of the filing of hundreds of lawsuits seeking 
judicial redress, in 2001 the country’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the government should 
resume payment of the land-reform debt after updating its nominal value on an actuarial basis. And 
yet, successive administrations did not act on this ruling, despite the fact that since the mid-1990s 
Peru has exhibited vigorous economic growth, significantly strengthened public finances, and 
substantially improved creditworthiness, such that governments have had more than the necessary 
ample fiscal resources to redeem the land-reform bonds at their full, original value. 
It was not until July 2013 that the Constitutional Tribunal reaffirmed the government’s 
obligation to pay the current value of the agrarian debt and gave it six months to issue a decree-law 
regulating the procedure for payments on the land-reform bonds. The current (Ollanta Humala) 
government complied, but it put forth an adjustment formula which does not revalue the bonds 
correctly and leaves them nearly worthless, thus adding insult to long-standing injury. Evidently, we 
are now in the presence of a case of blatant unwillingness to pay, one which undermines Peru’s 
claim to be a nation that is creditworthy, investor-friendly, and respectful of the rule of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 1969 until 1979, while leftist military dictators ruled Peru, more than 22 million acres of 
cultivated or grazing farmland – one-third of Peru’s total agricultural acreage, or seven-and-a-half 
times the land area of Connecticut – were expropriated from thousands of large owners as part of a 
property reform intended to benefit up to 400,000 landless peasant families.1  
The cumulative economic value of the agricultural lands expropriated in the 1970s has 
recently been estimated to exceed the equivalent of more than $40 billion.2 The land seizures were 
part of a broader agenda of nationalizations (involving the oil, copper and banking industries), heavy 
state intervention in labor, agricultural and financial markets, and income-redistributive policies 
reminiscent of the kind implemented in Venezuela in the past dozen years.3 
The then-prevailing Constitution of 1933 contemplated land reforms to promote small and 
medium-sized farming, but was protective of property rights: Articles 29 and 47 stated that these 
rights were inviolable, and they could be affected by law in cases of public necessity only after 
appropriate compensation was paid.4  
In the event, however, the compensation provided was miserly: while ranchers at least were 
paid in cash for their herds, recognized land values were very low, based on outdated book values or 
on tax-related assessments for 1968, and only 15 percent of expropriated land was paid in cash. The 
average compensation value per acre was less than one-tenth the then-prevailing market price of 
water-accessible, cultivated land.5  
                                                
1 The Peruvian experiment privileged about 56 percent of landless families – mostly the families of workers in 
large estates – and ended up creating a large number of cooperatives which proved largely unsuccessful for a variety of 
reasons; most were later subdivided into small farms which were likewise uneconomical. See Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Riego, “El proceso de reforma agraria” available at http://minagri.gob.pe/portal/objetivos/70-marco-legal/titulacion-
agraria-en-el-peru/413-el-proceso-de-reforma-agraria; José María Caballero and Elena Álvarez, Aspectos Cuantitativos 
de la Reforma Agraria, 1969-1979 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980), available at 
http://archivo.iep.pe/textos/DDT/aspectoscuantitativos.pdf; and José Matos Mar and José Manuel Mejía, La Reforma 
Agraria en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980), available at 
http://archivo.iep.pe/textos/DDT/reformaagraria.pdf. 
2 Measured as the present value of agricultural production flows from expropriated lands, based on estimated 
historical cash flows of agricultural production generated by these lands plus the discounted cash flows of projected 
agricultural production. See Deloitte (Peru), “Comparative Analysis of Supreme Decree #017-2014-EF and #019-2014-
EF and Economic Value of Land Expropriated During Peruvian Agrarian Reform,” March 2015, cited in the Brief filed 
by the Asociación de Bonistas de la Deuda Agraria del Perú (ABDA) with the Constitutional Tribunal, March 16, 2015, 
p. 5, available at http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Peticion-de-ABDA.pdf. 
3 “Government planners [became] convinced of the advantages of a centrally planned and controlled 
agricultural sector, with directives, credits, inputs, and so on emanating from central authorities to regional offices.” See 
Colin Harding, “Land Reform and Social Conflict in Peru,” in The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under 
Military Rule, ed. by Abraham F. Lowenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 252-53. 
4 See Constitución Política del Perú (March 29, 1933), available at 
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/constituciones_ordenado/CONSTIT_1933/Cons1933_TEXTO.pdf. 
5 See Caballero and Álvarez, op. cit., p. 64. As per Matos Mar and Mejía, op. cit., p. 180, land values assigned 
during the reform “do not represent the real value of the assets expropriated, the majority of which were depreciated 
excessively, despite their having still many years of useful lives.” See also p. 294. 
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Moreover, the 85 percent of recognized land values that were not remunerated in cash were 
settled with long-term Agrarian Debt Bonds (Bonos de la Deuda Agraria), which committed future 
governments to honor fixed coupons of 6, 5 or 4 percent per annum on securities maturing in 20, 25 
or 30 years, respectively.6 The face value of the bonds issued during 1969-79 was approximately 11.4 
billion soles de oro (the legal tender at the time), the equivalent of $250 million, or 2½ percent of GDP, 
on a weighted-average basis.7 To put it in context, $250 million was the mean (and median) of just 
one year’s worth of agricultural exports during the 1969-79 period.8 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Peru was severely mismanaged by populist military and then 
civilian regimes, and thus the country experienced violent economic cycles which included 
hyperinflation and systemic debt, banking and currency crises. Given that the coupons and principal 
of the Agrarian Debt Bonds were not explicitly protected from the ravages of high inflation and 
massive currency devaluation, the bonds quickly became worthless. Adding insult to great injury, 
during the late 1980s the Peruvian authorities started to ignore even their rapidly shrinking debt-
service obligations, and they eventually stopped making all payments due on these bonds.  
One likely reason why the government ceased to service the bonded debt is that peasant 
beneficiaries of the land reform were supposed to pay for their plots on an installment plan, but 
despite the shrinking burden of fixed payments given accelerating inflation and currency devaluation, 
most did not meet their obligations because of mounting financial difficulties.9 In recognition of the 
problem, in November of 1979, the outgoing military government passed a decree-law forgiving the 
debt owed by the reform beneficiaries.10 This undermined the intermediary government bank (Banco 
Agrario), because it was supposed to use the payments received from reform beneficiaries to meet 
obligations to those whose land had been expropriated and who had been given Agrarian Debt 
Bonds in compensation.11 
The economy was finally stabilized and constructively reformed during the 1990s, when 
President Alberto Fujimori was at the helm, and additionally by sensible governments since then. 
For example, whereas inflation had galloped at a two-digit annual rate during the 1970s, and then at 
a three- and even four-digit annual rate during the 1980s, it came down rapidly and to single digits 
                                                
6 Caballero and Álvarez, op. cit., Table 8, p. 62. 
7 To calculate a proper average valuation for the 1969-79 period, it was assumed that bonds were issued in 
direct proportion to the amount of land expropriated in each year, and then the imputed face-value amounts were 
converted into US dollars at the average soles-oro/dollar exchange rate prevailing each year. Then the resulting total was 
compared to the dollar-equivalent annual average GDP figure. Additional bonds were issued in 1982, as mentioned 
below. 
8 Calculated from various issues of the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru’s Annual Report (1975-1981), 
available at http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/publicaciones/memoria-anual.html. 
9 As reported at the time, “The problems of the new enterprises, often unwieldy and beset by social conflicts, 
are compounded by the official pricing policy for agricultural produce, as implemented by the state purchasing and 
marketing agency, EPSA (Empresa Pública de Servicios Agropecuarios). In order to keep prices to the (predominantly 
urban) consumers low, the prices paid by EPSA to the producers in the reformed and private sectors are uniformly low. 
This discourages production, and reduces the profits available for reinvestment.” See Harding, op. cit., p. 253. 
10 Caballero and Álvarez, op. cit., p. 54 and 71-72. 
11 The Banco Agrario was finally declared insolvent and shut down in 2008, see Resolución Suprema Nº 076-
2008-EF, September 26, 2008, available at http://www.cepes.org.pe/apc-aa/archivos-
aa/4a15e4303d8c04dde2018292e444138c/RS_076_2008_EF.pdf 
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after 1996, averaging under 3 percent per annum since then.12 And while real GDP had grown at an 
average rate of 3½ percent per year during the 1970s, and then hardly at all during the 1980s, the 
economy expanded at a pace of 3¼ percent per annum during the 1990s and then 5¼ percent yearly 
since 2000.13 As a result, real GDP has nearly quadrupled since 1990. 
 
FIGURES 1 AND 2: PERU INFLATION AND REAL GDP 
    
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
I. SEEKING REDRESS IN PERU 
A revised and updated constitutional text came into effect in 1993, and it strengthened property 
rights in Peru significantly. Under its Article 70, it was specified that any property seizures had to be 
compensated in cash and, moreover, that the affected owners had the right to challenge in the courts 
whatever reparation had been decided by a government during the expropriation process.14  
An earlier (1984) reform of the Civil Code had legalized the practice of indexation (Article 
1235) and provided that when “the value of an obligation is to be repaid, it shall be calculated to 
reflect the value it has at the time of payment, except as otherwise provided by the law or a contract” 
(Article 1236).15 Indeed, until the end of 2004, all Peruvian companies had to fully adjust for 
inflation in their balance sheets for accounting and taxation purposes, except for those authorized to 
                                                
12 See Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (hereafter, BCRP), Estadísticas, 
https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/inflacion. 
13 See BCRP, Estadísticas, https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/pbi-gasto.  
14 See Constitución Política del Perú (1993), available at http://www.pcm.gob.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Constitucion-Política-del-Peru-1993.pdf. A constitutional text which had come into effect in 
1979, once the military returned to their barracks, already fortified property rights by specifying in its Article 125 that 
expropriations had to be paid in cash and before they became effective, see Constitución Política del Perú (12 de julio de 
1979), available at 
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/constituciones_ordenado/CONSTIT_1979/Cons1979_TEXTO_CO
RREGIDO.pdf.  
15 See Código Civil de Perú, available at http://www.abogadoperu.com/codigo-civil-peru-1984-abogado-
ley.php. For useful background, see Felipe Osterling Parodi and Mario Castillo Freyre, Estudio sobre las Obligaciones 
Dinerarias en el Perú (México, DF: UNAM, 1995), available at 
http://www.castillofreyre.com/archivos/pdf/publicaciones/catalogo/obligaciones_dinerarias.pdf.  
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keep records in foreign currency.16 The government also started to issue longer-dated bonds indexed 
to inflation, with maturities of ten (in 2003), twenty (2004) and thirty years (2005).17 The legalized 
alternatives of indexation to inflation or to the price of a U.S. dollar, as well as the rights granted by 
Article 70 in the 1993 constitution, encouraged mistreated land-reform bondholders to seek judicial 
redress for their enormous losses due to inflation and currency devaluation.  
And yet, the Fujimori administration took a decidedly hard line when it came to land-reform 
bondholders during a time (mid-1990s) when it was constructively engaged with all other creditors 
(mainly international, official and private), on which Peru had been in default since 1983-84. These 
efforts paved the way for Peru’s normalization of international financial relations, following the 
curing of protracted defaults to the IMF (1985-1993) and World Bank (1989-1992), the Paris Club 
of official creditors (who provided debt relief in 1991, 1993 and 1996), and foreign commercial 
banks which granted debt forgiveness under the aegis of the Brady Plan (1997).18 In the midst of 
that encouraging period of normalization, however, the national legislature passed, and President 
Fujimori signed, a law (#26597) specifically denying the application of Civil Code Article 1236 to the 
Agrarian Debt Bonds.19 
Such discriminatory legislation was soon challenged in the courts, however, via a petition 
lodged in December 1996 on behalf of agrarian bondholders with Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal. It 
alleged that Law #26597 affected the valuation criteria and payment for expropriated lands in 
blatant violation of the Civil Code and the 1993 Constitution. While the high court was considering 
the petition, rather than compromising, the legislature twice joined forces with the Fujimori 
administration to curb the rights of creditors to collect judicial awards against the government.20 
Then, three years later, practically on the eve of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling, the 
government finally backtracked by passing an emergency decree (#088-2000) recognizing the land-
reform debt. It offered to convert any original bonds still outstanding into U.S. dollars at the official 
exchange rate in effect on their issue date, applying to the result an interest rate of 7½ percent per 
annum. The downside was that the old bonds thus revalued would have to be swapped for new, 30-
year obligations paying zero interest.21 
                                                
16 See Estudio Echecopar-Baker & McKenzie, Doing Business in Peru: 2014, p. 25, available at 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/bef43867-252f-465b-abc6-
10d4edd5d078/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0ba32590-7ee8-4c58-85ab-58fd5c20759f/bk_peru_db_mar14.pdf.  
17 See Allison Holland and Christian Mulder, “Can Indexed Debt Absolve Original Sin? The Role of Inflation-
indexed Debt in Developing Local Currency Markets,” in Financial Dollarization: The Policy Agenda, ed. by Adrián 
Armas, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, and Alain Ize (Washington: IMF, 2006), p. 247. 
18 See Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou and Christoph Trebesch, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-
2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts,” IMF Working Paper No. 12/203, August 2012, and Manuel 
Monteagudo, “Peru’s Experience in Sovereign Debt Management and Litigation: Some Lessons for the Legal Approach 
to Sovereign Indebtedness,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Fall 2010, pp. 201-14. 
19 See Ley N° 26597 (April 24, 1996), available at http://docs.peru.justia.com/federales/leyes/26597-apr-22-
1996.pdf.  
20 Two laws were passed to this effect: N° 26599 of April 22, 1996, available at 
http://docs.peru.justia.com/federales/leyes/26599-apr-22-1996.pdf, and N° 26756 of March 7, 1997, available at 
http://docs.peru.justia.com/federales/leyes/26756-mar-7-1997.pdf.  
21 See Decreto de Urgencia N° 088-2000, October 9, 2000, available at http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Decreto-de-Urgencia-088-2000.pdf. 
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In essence, the government was offering to exchange a compulsory, interest-bearing loan to 
the government with an original maturity of from 20 to 30 years into a compulsory, interest-free 
loan for an extra 30 years. In the event, the legality of this decree would likewise be challenged, and 
in an August 2004 ruling, the Constitutional Tribunal would deem it to be an optional, but by no 
means mandatory, solution for agrarian bondholders.22 
In March 2001, the Constitutional Tribunal announced its decision on Law #26597, ruling 
unconstitutional the government’s 1996 attempt to keep the Agrarian Debt Bonds from being 
adjusted in accordance with the valuation principles enshrined in Article 1236 of the Civil Code and 
Article 70 of the 1993 Constitution.23 This landmark decision was a huge victory for creditor rights 
in Peru, and subsequently it was twice validated by Peru’s Supreme Court, in 2006 and again in 2010, 
in rulings concluding that bonds must be adjusted and paid at their full, original value.24 
Regrettably, neither of President Fujimori’s elected successors, Alejandro Toledo (2001-
2006) and Alan García (2006-2011), took steps to address the default on Agrarian Debt Bonds by 
restoring their value through indexation to intervening inflation or currency devaluation, and by 
restarting debt-service payments. And yet, during their administrations, Peru exhibited vigorous 
economic growth, significantly strengthened public finances, and substantially improved 
creditworthiness, such that they were comfortably positioned to finally cure the default on land-
reform debt. 
For example, the non-financial public sector posted shrinking deficits during the first half of 
the 2000s, and then mostly surpluses during 2006-2011 and beyond.25 The ratio of public-sector debt 
to GDP shrunk from around 50 percent in the early 2000s to the vicinity of 20 percent by 2011 and 
thereafter.26 The country’s official international reserves skyrocketed from $9 billion at the start of 
2000 to nearly $50 billion by the end of 2011 – and then climbed further to above $60 billion.27  
  
                                                
22 See Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional (Case N° 0009-2004-AI/TC), August 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2005/00009-2004-AI.html. 
23 See Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional, March 15, 2001, available at 
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2001/00022-1996-AI.html.  
24 See Corte Suprema Casación N° 1002-2005-ICA, July 12, 2006, and Casación N° 1958-2009-LIMA, January 
26, 2010. 
25 See BCRP, Estadísticas, https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/resultado-economico. 
26 Ibid., https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/deuda-publica. 
27 Ibid., https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/reservas-internacionales. 
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FIGURES 3 AND 4: PERU FISCAL BALANCES AND PUBLIC DEBT 
    
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
 
These exceedingly favorable trends were recognized and rewarded by the leading credit-
rating agencies. That is why, in terms of its long-term, foreign-currency ratings, Peru went from 
being considered a BB credit in 2000 (as per Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, Ba3 as per Moody’s) to 
an investment-grade credit in 2008/09, and on upwards to a BBB+ rating in recent years (Fitch and 
Standard & Poor’s) – or even higher (A3 as per Moody’s). Moreover, the country’s long-term, local-
currency ratings have been pegged at the high A-/A3 level as per all three of the leading agencies.28 
After waiting for over a decade to no avail for justice to be carried out, in October 2011, 
plaintiffs filed a petition with the Constitutional Tribunal seeking enforcement of its March 2001 
decision – the one which had declared Law #26597 unconstitutional and had endorsed the principle 
that the Agrarian Reform Debt should be adjusted to reflect its fair value.  
Twenty-one months later, in July 2013, the Tribunal handed down its ruling. It reaffirmed 
the government’s obligation to pay the current value of the agrarian debt, and gave it six months to 
issue a decree-law regulating the procedure for the recording, valuation and forms of payment of the 
land-reform bonds. However, it sided with the government (the Ollanta Humala administration) 
when it came to how the obligations would be valued. The Ministry of Economy and Finance had 
argued that Peru could not afford to pay the current value of the land reform debt if it were to be 
adjusted for intervening domestic inflation, because doing so would impose too heavy a burden on 
its budget and affect its ability to provide essential services. Therefore, the Tribunal ordered that the 
adjusted value of the bonds be calculated in an unusual way – by indexing the existing obligations to 
their equivalents in foreign currency, and then applying an interest rate for U.S. Treasury bonds, in a 
manner to be defined by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.29 
                                                
28 See Peru Ministry of Economy and Finance, Credit Ratings, available at 
http://www.mef.gob.pe/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2892%3Acredit-
ratings&catid=429%3Arelations&Itemid=102039&lang=es 
29 See Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, July 16, 2013, available at http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/TC-Exp.-00022-1996-Resolución-16-de-julio-de-2013.pdf, especially #25. However, a 
criminal investigation is now underway as to how this decision was actually reached, because in September 2015 a senior 
member of the Constitutional Tribunal filed a criminal complaint alleging that an original majority opinion that he signed, 
and that would have updated the bonds using the extent of cumulative domestic inflation rather than currency 
devaluation, was doctored using liquid whiteout and falsely transformed into an alleged dissenting opinion. The former 
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In January 2014, the government issued two decree-laws spelling out its regulations for 
registering, adjusting and paying the defaulted agrarian debt.30 To the great disappointment of long-
suffering bondholders, the regulations (a) demanded that creditors waive their legal rights to pursue 
redress through the courts in order to be able to register their holdings, leaving them in a vulnerable 
position; (b) set up a seven-step, discriminatory hierarchy of creditors according to their age, 
whether they are original or secondary holders, and whether they are individual or institutional 
holders;31 and (c) imposed erroneous indexation formulas that would value the bonds at less than a 
penny on the dollar of what they are worth under correct formulas – more on this below. 
Moreover, the guidelines said nothing about the form of compensation bondholders would 
ultimately receive after what is likely to be a lengthy process measured in years, leaving it unclear if in 
the end they would be paid in cash or with a replacement bond – potentially, with a low coupon and 
a very long maturity. The fact that the decree-laws were silent on this crucial point was rightly taken 
by land-reform bondholders as an ominous sign. So was the statement in the guidelines that 
payment “options” will be contingent on the observance of “principles of fiscal equilibrium and 
financial sustainability, as well as fiscal rules and the multi-year macroeconomic framework.”32 
Evidently, the government reserves the right to service its land-reform debt depending on 
circumstances within and beyond its control. 
In March 2015, the Land Reform Bondholders Association (ABDA) filed a motion with the 
Constitutional Tribunal requesting standing in the land-reform debt matter and judicial review of the 
government’s formulas for valuing the bonds.33 
Their legal brief explained how the government’s method for converting the original bonds 
denominated in soles de oro into U.S. dollars using a so-called parity exchange rate was “logically, 
mathematically and equitably indefensible.”34 The government’s formulas calculate the so-called 
parity exchange rate incorrectly by incorporating a clear algebraic error;35 they use inappropriately the 
interest rate on one-year U.S. Treasuries, rather than yields on U.S. government bonds of relevant 
                                                                                                                                                       
Court Secretary to the Constitutional Tribunal has since been criminally charged by Lima prosecutors for falsification of 
court documents with regard to this decision, and a judge has recently denied the Court Secretary’s request to dismiss the 
action, ruling that the criminal proceeding will continue. See “Juzgarán a ex relator del TC por adulterar fallo sobre 
bonos,” La República, January 7, 2016, available at http://larepublica.pe/impresa/politica/731697-juzgaran-ex-relator-
del-tc-por-adulterar-fallo-sobre-bonos. 
30 See Decreto Supremo N° 017-2014-EF, January 18, 2014, available at http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Decreto-Supremo-017-2014-EF.pdf. It was supplemented, for the case of bondholders who 
had received coupon payments, by Decreto Supremo N° 019-2014-EF, January 22, 2014, available at 
http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Decreto-Supremo-019-2014-EF.pdf.  
31 Original bondholders aged 65 year or older get first place in the seniority scheme, while institutional 
bondholders who purchased the bonds in the secondary market (“for speculative purposes”) are relegated to the bottom. 
32 Decreto Supremo N° 017-2014-EF, op. cit., Article 17. 
33 The Association consists of more than 340 members that hold agrarian reform bonds, see “Bonistas 
conforman alianza para cobrar deuda agraria,” Radio Programas del Perú, April 21, 2015, available at 
http://www.rpp.com.pe/2015-04-21-bonistas-conforman-alianza-para-cobrar-deuda-agraria-noticia_789838.html.  
34 See Brief filed by the Asociación de Bonistas de la Deuda Agraria del Perú (ABDA), March 16, 2015, p. 29, 
based on a variety of expert testimony presented, available at http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Peticion-de-ABDA.pdf.  
35 Ibid., pp. 49-53. The government’s formula absurdly has an exchange rate on the left-hand side, and a 
squared exchange rate on the right-hand side, of a key equation. 
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(namely, long) maturity;36 and convert dollar values back to Peruvian currency (nowadays, the nuevos 
soles) at 2013 exchange rates without further interest accrual thereafter.37  
The bondholders backed their appeal with highly credible, technical reports from several 
leading academic and financial experts, including a detailed study by Deloitte which calculated, 
among other things, the adjusted, contemporary value of a 20-year, land-reform bond issued in 1975, 
with a face value of 5,000 soles de oro and paying 6 percent per annum, with all of its coupons 
unclipped, under three potential methods with a final valuation and payment date of 2013.  
In the first method, the payout resulting from having the bond adjusted in reflection of the 
deleterious impact of accumulated inflation through 2013 would be 29,544 nuevos soles, or $9,894. In 
the second method, the payout resulting from having the bond adjusted in reflection of a correct 
parity exchange-rate calculation would be 10,218 nuevos soles, or $3,422. Under the third method, as 
per the government’s erroneous formula appearing in the decree-law of January 2014, that bond 
would be redeemed for just 71.67 nuevos soles, or a pathetic $24. In other words, the government was 
offering to pay less than one percent of what a dollarization formula with a correct parity exchange 
rate would imply, or one-tenth of one percent of what an inflation-adjusted calculation – the most 
common method used in Peru for constant-value calculations – would deliver.38 
Unfortunately for the bondholders, the Constitutional Tribunal wasted no time in rejecting 
their motion. In April 2015, not even a month after it had been filed, the court dismissed their 
petition explaining that ABDA had not provided persuasive evidence of its proper standing in this 
case, and that the petition was premature because, notwithstanding the inclusion of detailed 
formulas in the two decree-laws in question, the actual calculation of the value of the bonds was still 
to be made by the government.39 
However, the court did warn the government that “in no case can the revaluation of the 
debt result in an outcome which in fact involves the application of a minimalist criterion which 
damages the bondholders. Therefore, this Court reserves the right to ensure the proper 
determination of the [valuation of the] debt.”40 
Essentially, the bondholders were told to turn in their agrarian debt certificates, go through 
the lengthy and confusing process offered by the government, and if they come out of it feeling 
maltreated, then they could always come back to the Constitutional Tribunal for a determination on 
whether or not they were wronged. After some forty years and still counting, seeking redress in Peru 
if you are a holder of Agrarian Debt Bonds is obviously a case of “Justice delayed is Justice denied.” 
                                                
36 Ibid., pp. 56-58. 
37 Ibid., pp. 58-59. These flaws are in addition to other problems with the regulations, including incorrectly 
updating the value of bonds with clipped coupons as of the date of the oldest unclipped coupon, rather than the date of 
issuance, and failing to offer meaningful compensatory interest for past-due interest and principal. 
38 Deloitte (Peru), Table 4, p. 16, as cited in the ABDA Brief filed with the Constitutional Tribunal, March 16, 
2015, op. cit., p. 40. And as per the government’s erroneous formula, a bond whose coupons had been clipped would be 
entirely worthless. 
39 This rush to judgment was an aberration by Peruvian judicial standards. As noted earlier, the petition filed 
with the Constitutional Tribunal in October 2011 seeking enforcement of its March 2001 ruling took almost two years to 
be decided. 
40 See Auto del Tribunal Constitucional (Case N° 0022-1996-PI/TC), April 7, 2015, p. 3, available at 
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2015/00022-1996-AI%20Resolucion2.pdf. 
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II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
When a legally valid debt goes unpaid for decades, no matter how good are the financial 
circumstances of the debtor, and notwithstanding how clear are the rulings of the highest judicial 
authorities, then we are in the presence of a case of unwillingness to pay. And this is why Peru’s 
selective default on its land-reform obligations is a shameful stain on the country’s otherwise high 
creditworthiness. 
Although the government has not released any information on the face-value amount still 
outstanding of these bonds, in 2005 the congressional Committee on Agrarian Affairs issued a 
report which made specific mention of an estimate that had been provided by the Ministry of 
Economy’s Directorate of Public Credit at the time: 13.285 billion of these soles de oro bonds had 
been issued; 10.763 billion of redemptions had taken place; therefore, a balance of 2.522 billion was 
in circulation. The congressional report stated that, depending on the indexation method employed, 
that balance translated into a figure as low as $1.2 billion and as high as $3.1 billion.41 
Given the passage of a decade, by now the updated value of the land-reform debt is surely 
higher mainly because of the accrued interest, but in minor part also, if translated into U.S. dollars, 
because the Peruvian currency strengthened over time on an inflation-adjusted basis – about 12 
percent versus the U.S. dollar from mid-2005 until mid-2015.42  
The range of private estimates can be very wide, however, because of two key unknowns: (a) 
in which year the land-reform bonds outstanding were issued – it could be as early as 1969 but as 
late as 1982; and (b) how many coupons were paid, or went unpaid, on the bonds that remain 
outstanding. For example, one group of expert witnesses (Benavides, Peñaranda and Adrianzen) 
recently came up with an estimate of $5.1 billion for the end-2014.43 Standard & Poor’s mentions in 
its September 2015 report on Peru that “the maximum amount estimated by the creditors is $4 
billon.”44 
Nevertheless, any reasonable estimates made suggest that the proper recognition of Agrarian 
Debt Bonds still outstanding would put no stress on Peru’s extremely healthy public finances. If the 
land-reform debt turned out to be on the order of $5 billon, for instance, that would be the 
                                                
41 See Comisión Agraria del Congreso, “Dictamen recaído en los Proyectos de ley N° 578/2001-CR, N° 
7440/2002-CR, N° 8988/2003-CR, N° 10599/2003-CR, N° 11459/2004-CR, and N° 11971/2004-CR, que propone la 
“Ley de Seguridad Jurídica para el Saneamiento Físico Legal de predios afectados por el Proceso de Reforma Agraria y la 
Actualización y Pago de la Deuda Agraria,” May 10, 2005, p. 13, available at http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Dictamen-Comisión-Agraria-15-de-mayo-2005.pdf. 
42 See BCRP, Estadísticas, Tipo de Cambio Real Bilateral, 
https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/mensuales/tipo-de-cambio-real.  
43 See lsmael Benavides, Cesar Penaranda and Carlos Adrianzen, “Sobre los Costos y Beneficios del 
Saneamiento del Default de la Deuda Agraria Peruana,” February 17, 2015, p. 5, available at 
http://bonosagrarios.pe/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Reporte pericial de Benavides.pdf.  
44 Standard & Poor’s, “Supplementary Analysis: Republic of Peru,” September 30, 2015, p. 12, available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/1458085. 
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equivalent of about 2½ percent of Peru’s GDP.45 If it were to be recognized and added onto the 
government’s balance sheet overnight, the existing stock of public debt would increase from a very 
low of around 20 percent of GDP to a still very low 22.5 percent of GDP.46  
As it is, Peru’s ratio of public debt to GDP is exactly half the median of developing 
countries rated Baa1 to Baa3 by Moody’s, such that all else being equal, the government could take 
on even an extra twenty percentage points of GDP in debt (namely, $40 billion) without necessarily 
coming under downward rating pressure.47  
Evidence that the recognition of the true value of the land-reform debt would not adversely 
impact Peru’s creditworthiness is provided by how Standard & Poor’s recently described the 
contingent liability which this defaulted debt represents, in addition to certain other potential 
government obligations: 
“The eventual payment by the government of agriculture bonds – issued in the 1970s 
during a land expropriation program – is another contingent liability. The nominal value of these 
bonds collapsed with the currency change to the nuevo sol. In 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled 
in favor of bondholders and ordered the government to pay these bonds at their present value. The 
amount and timing of payment is not known. The maximum amount estimated by the creditors is 
US$4 billon (about 2% of GDP). Neither [other potential liabilities] nor the agricultural bonds 
are significant enough in size compared with the current government debt level to modify the starting 
limited contingent-liability assessment under our criteria.”48 
 
Moody’s has also weighed in recently on the potential fiscal implications of recognizing and 
settling the land-reform bonds outstanding, which represent “an unpaid liability of the government 
through the end of their tenor”:  
“We believe that the effect would be limited and manageable. Peru’s gross public 
debt/GDP ratio of under 23% is significantly below the ‘A’ category median of 40%, and we 
expect fiscal deficits below 3% of GDP through 2017. … Even under a worst-case scenario, … the 
liability would represent less than 2.6% of GDP. Spread out over a number of years, the payouts 
would not materially affect the sovereign’s fiscal dynamics or its creditworthiness. Under all scenarios, 
in addition to cash payments, the government could also exchange the [unpaid bonds] for market 
instruments.”49 
 
To be sure, it would matter to the government’s cash flow whether the bonds were paid out 
all at once in cash or if they were redeemed over a period of several years – and whether they were 
                                                
45 Data for 2014 calculated from BCRP, Estadísticas, available at 
https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/pbi-gasto and 
https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/anuales/tipo-de-cambio-nominal.  
46 Data for 2014 calculated from BCRP, Estadísticas, available at 
https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/trimestrales/deuda-publica.  
47 Data for 2015, see Moody’s Investors Service, “Statistical Handbook: Country Credit,” May 2015, p. 99. 
48 Standard & Poor’s, op. cit. 
49 Moody’s Investors Service, “Government of Peru: FAQ on Peru’s Bonos de la Deuda Agraria,” December 
18, 2015, p. 3. 
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paid out of fiscal reserves or financed through new debt issuance. Still, it is worthy of note that the 
government’s own liquid reserves in domestic currency (nuevos soles) have risen steadily to the 
equivalent (at market exchange rates) of over $17 billion as of the end of 2015, such that the 
authorities could literally pay the defaulted bonds overnight, in cash, and still have plenty of funds 
left over.50 
It is because Peru’s ability to settle and pay the land-reform debt is so very ample that we are 
in the presence of a case of blatant unwillingness to pay. And this is a troubling realization, indeed, 
because the government actively markets Peru as a country in which “past mistakes have helped us 
set up sounder policies,” there is a “friendly environment for doing business,” and there is a “wide 
range of investment opportunities” including in farmland and agro-businesses.51  
Moreover, the government does not acknowledge that it is in selected default and that it has 
been involved in a protracted dispute with its land-reform bond creditors, both domestic and 
foreign. According to recent prospectuses filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
in connection with the August 2015 placement of $1.25 billion of U.S. dollar-denominated Global 
Bonds due in 2027, and the October 2015 sale of €1.1 billion of euro-denominated Global Bonds 
due in 2026, “Peru is unaware of any other claims filed against it, in Peru or abroad, for overdue 
debt payments and Peru is not involved in any disputes with its internal or external creditors.”52 This 
is an inaccurate description of reality at hand, as freshly pointed out by a renowned securities-law 
professor who researched the matter.53  
 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
 
The troubling case of the Agrarian Debt Bonds demonstrates that governments in Peru are fully 
capable of mistreating legitimate creditors for very long periods of time, and also of ignoring the will 
and intent of the country’s highest courts, thereby undermining the rule of law.54 Given what has 
transpired and current official attitudes in Lima, Peru does not deserve a top credit rating on its 
sovereign debt.  
                                                
50 Data for December 2015 calculated from BCRP, Estadísticas, Posición de las Cuentas Disponibles Moneda 
Nacional, available at https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/mensuales/resultados/P00569FIM/html, plus 
Saldo de Bonos Soberanos Moneda Nacional, 
https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/mensuales/resultados/P00571FIM/html. 
51 See Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Peru: Investment Opportunities,” March 2014, available at 
http://www.mef.gob.pe/contenidos/english/presentations/INPERU_NY_march_2014.pdf.  
52 See Peru Prospectus Supplements (to prospectuses dated August 18, 2015), Debt Record, S-1, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77694/000119312515294056/d17726d424b5.htm and 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77694/000119312515355983/d58194d424b5.htm, respectively. 
53 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Legal Opinion on disclosures that were set forth in prospectuses filed by the 
Republic of Peru with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,” January 11, 2016, available at 
http://perubonds.org/wp-content/uploads/resources/coffee_opinion___final_executed.pdf. 
54 For a moving, first-person investor account, see Antonio Llaveria, “Haunted by a legacy of betrayal, 
Peruvians still seek justice,” The Hill, November 12, 2015, available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-
policy/259887-haunted-by-a-legacy-of-betrayal-peruvians-still-seek.  
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In recent months, two small but independent rating agencies, HR Ratings and Egan-Jones, 
have done their own assessments of Peru, and both rightly assigned a D rating to the defaulted land-
reform bonds.55 In addition, Egan Jones, after taking into consideration this default and other 
weaknesses in the underlying credit story, also rated Peru a sub-investment-grade, BB credit.56  
Now that the proverbial writing is on the wall, and before investors and the leading credit-
rating agencies catch on and start to cast doubt on Peru’s creditworthiness, as well as to forestall a 
potentially embarrassing international-arbitration claim by jilted creditors under one of Peru’s 
bilateral investment treaties,57 it behooves the authorities in Peru to change course and deal promptly 
and fairly with the land-reform debt.  
A nation which seeks to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), as Peru aspires to do in the years to come, must demonstrate that it respects creditor 
rights and the rule of law.58 Until it does, the malign neglect of the country’s land-reform 
bondholders will remain a stain on Peru’s reputation and creditworthiness. 
                                                
55 “HR Ratings has assigned a rating of HR D (G) to the Peruvian Agrarian Debt Bonds, classes A, B & C, 
issued by Peru, October 27, 2015, available at 
http://www.hrratings.com/pdf/Peruvian%20Agrarian%20Debt%20Reform%20Bonds%20Press%20Release_20151027
.pdf; and “Egan-Jones Assigns a First-time Rating of “BB” to the Republic of Peru’s International Bonds [and a Rating 
of “D” to Peruvian Land Reform Bonds,” November 17, 2015, available at https://www.egan-
jones.com/public/press/egan-jones-rates-peru-bonds.aspx.  
56 Ibid. 
57 See Robin Wigglesworth and Andres Schipani, “Hedge fund pressures Peru to pay back 40-year-old debt,” 
Financial Times, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db360686-6ba5-11e5-aca9-
d87542bf8673.html#ixzz3nt1bLvQ3.  
58 See World Bank, “Peru Exchanges Experiences with Countries on the Road to Joining the Club of 
Developed Countries,” May 7, 2015, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/05/07/ocde-peru-
intercambia-experiencias-con-paises-en-camino-para-entrar-en-el-club-de-los-paises-desarrollados.  
